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Abstract
This paper examines the transmission of income inequality into consumption inequality and in
so doing investigates the degree of insurance to income shocks. Panel data on income from the
PSID is combined with consumption data from repeated CEX cross-sections to identify the degree
of insurance to permanent and transitory shocks. In the process we also present new evidence of
the growth in the variance of permanent and transitory shocks in the US during the 1980s. We ﬁnd
some partial insurance of permanent income shocks with more insurance possibilities for the college
educated and those nearing retirement. We ﬁnd little evidence against full insurance for transitory
income shocks except among low income households. Tax and welfare beneﬁts are found to play
an important role in insuring permanent shocks. Adding durable expenditures to the consumption
measure suggests that durable replacement is an important insurance mechanism, especially for
transitory income shocks.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Under complete markets agents can sign contingent contracts providing full insurance against
idiosyncratic shocks to income. Moral hazard and asymmetric information, however, make these
contracts hard to implement, and in fact they are rarely observed in reality. Even a cursory look
at consumption and income data reveals the weakness of the complete markets hypothesis. Thus
volatility of individual consumption is much higher than the volatility of aggregate consumption,
a fact against full insurance [Aiyagari, 1994]. Moreover, there is a substantial amount of mobility
in consumption [Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2004]. Formal tests of the complete markets hypothesis
[see Attanasio and Davis, 1996], have often found the null hypothesis of full consumption insurance
is rejected. Attempts to salvage the theory by allowing for risk sharing within the family and no
risk sharing among unrelated families have also been unable to ﬁnd evidence of complete insurance
[Hayashi, Altonji and Kotlikoﬀ, 1996].
In the textbook permanent income hypothesis the only mechanism available to agents to smooth
income shocks is personal savings. The main idea is that people attempt to keep the expected
marginal utility of consumption stable over time. Since insurance markets for income ﬂuctuations
are assumed to be absent, the marginal utility of consumption is not stabilized across states.
I fi n c o m ei ss h i f t e db yp e r m a n e n ta n dt r a n s i t o r ys hocks, self-insurance through borrowing and
saving may allow intertemporal consumption smoothing against the latter but not against the
former [Deaton, 1992]. This is simply because one cannot borrow to smooth out a permanent
income decline without violating the budget constraint, so that permanent shocks to income will
be permanent shocks to consumption.1
Models that feature complete markets and those that allow for just personal savings as a smooth-
ing mechanism are clearly extreme characterization of individual behavior and of the economic
environment faced by the consumers. Deaton and Paxson [1994] notice this and envision “the
1Even with precautionary saving, permanent shocks to labour income will typically be almost fully transmitted
into consumption (see below).
1construction and testing of market models under partial insurance”, while Hayashi, Altonji and
Kotlikoﬀ [1996] call for future research to be “directed to estimating the extent of consumption
insurance over and above self-insurance”. In this paper we start from the premise of some, but not
necessarily full, insurance and consider the importance of distinguishing between transitory and
permanent shocks. We address the issue of whether partial consumption insurance is available to
agents and estimate the degree of insurance over and above self-insurance through savings. Our
research is related to other papers in the literature, particularly Hall and Mishkin [1982], Altonji,
Martins and Siow [2002], Deaton and Paxson [1994], Moﬃtt and Gottschalk [1994], and Blundell
and Preston [1998].2
Our data combine information from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) to document a number of key ﬁndings. We ﬁnd a strong
growth in permanent income shocks during the early 1980s. The variance of permanent shocks
thereafter levels oﬀ.W e ﬁnd compelling evidence against full insurance for permanent income
shocks but not for transitory income shocks, except for a low income subsample where transitory
shocks seem, unsurprisingly, less insurable. Further there is evidence of some partial insurance of
permanent income shocks, the degree of which varies across demographic groups. We ﬁnd that
consumption inequality − a topic that, with the notable exceptions of Cutler and Katz [1992] and
Dynarski and Gruber [1997], has been studied much less extensively than wage inequality − follows
closely the trends in permanent earnings inequality documented, among others, by Moﬃtt and
Gottschalk [1994].3 Our results point to durable expenditures being an important mechanism for
2Hall and Mishkin [1982] use panel data on food consumption and income from the PSID and consider the
covariance restrictions imposed by the PIH. Altonji, Martins, and Siow [2002] improve on this by estimating a
dynamic factor model of consumption, hours, wages, unemployment, and income, again using PSID data. Deaton
and Paxson [1994] use repeated cross-section data from the US, the UK, and Thailand to test the implications that
the PIH imposes on consumption inequality. Moﬃtt and Gottschalk [1994] use PSID panel on income to identify the
variance of permanent and transitory income shocks. Blundell and Preston [1998] use the growth in consumption
inequality over the 1980s in the U.K. to identify growth in permanent (uninsured) income inequality. Unlike Moﬃtt
and Gottschalk [1995] −who use panel data on income but not consumption− they use data on both income and
consumption but lack a panel dimension. Our use of panel data on income and consumption allows us to identify
t h ev a r i a n c eo ft h ei n c o m es h o c k sa sw e l la st h ed e g r e eo fi nsurance of consumption with respect to the two types of
shocks.
3The literature on consumption inequality is growing steadily. See, e.g., Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura [2004],
2smoothing non-durable consumption in the presence of income shocks especially for low income
households. Finally we show that taxes and transfers provide an important insurance mechanism
for permanent income shocks.
We use the term partial insurance to denote smoothing devices other than credit markets
for borrowing and saving. There is scattered evidence on the role played by such devices on
household consumption. Theoretical and empirical research have analyzed the role of extended
family networks [Kotlikoﬀ and Spivak, 1981; Attanasio and Rios-Rull, 2000], added worker eﬀects
[Stephens, 2002], the timing of durable purchases [Browning and Crossley, 2003], progressive income
taxation [Mankiw and Kimball, 1992, Auerbach and Feenberg, 2001, and Kniesner and Ziliak, 2002],
personal bankruptcy laws [Fay, Hurst and White, 2002], insurance within the ﬁrm [Guiso, Pistaferri
and Schivardi, 2003], and the role of government public policy programs, such as unemployment
insurance [Engen and Gruber, 2001], Medicaid [Gruber and Yelowitz, 1999], AFDC [Gruber, 2000],
and food stamps [Blundell and Pistaferri, 2003]. While we do not take a precise stand on the
mechanisms (other than savings) that are available to smooth idiosyncratic shocks to income, we
emphasize that our evidence can be used to uncover whether some of these mechanisms are actually
at work, how important they are quantitatively, and how they diﬀer across households and over
time. Our approach of examining the relationship between consumption and income inequality
follows the suggestion of Deaton [1997] that “although it is possible to examine the mechanisms
[providing partial insurance against income shocks], their multiplicity makes it attractive to look
directly at the magnitude that is supposed to be smoothed, namely consumption”.
The distinction between permanent and transitory shocks stressed in this paper is an important
one, as we might expect to uncover less insurance for more persistent shocks. This point has been
emphasized in the early work on the permanent income hypothesis and also in the recent wave
of limited commitment models, which is one example where one might expect the relationship
between income shocks and consumption to depend on the degree of persistence of income shocks.
Heathcote, Storesletten and Violante [2004], and Krueger and Perri [2003].
3The literature on insurance under limited commitment [Kehoe and Levine, 2001, Alvarez and
Jermann, 2000] explores the nature of income insurance schemes in economies where agents cannot
be prevented from withdrawing participation if the loss from the accumulated income gains they
are asked to forgo becomes greater than the gains from continuing participation. Such schemes, if
feasible, allow individuals to keep some of the positive shocks to their income and therefore oﬀer
only partial income insurance. The proportion of income shocks which is insured will vary −among
other things− with the variance of the underlying shocks. As the variance increases the value of
future participation increases, alleviating the participation constraint.4 This is particularly relevant
in the US and the UK, where quantitatively large changes in the structure of relative prices (most
notably, wages) have occurred over the last three decades, both within and between groups. The
results in Alvarez and Jermann also demonstrate that if income shocks are persistent enough and
agents are inﬁnitely lived, then participation constraints become so severe that no insurance scheme
is feasible. This suggests that the degree of insurance should be allowed to diﬀer between transitory
and permanent shocks and should also be allowed to change over time and across diﬀerent groups.
Uncovering the degree of partial insurance is likely to matter for a number of reasons. First, it
may help to understand the characteristics of the economic environment faced by the agents. This
may prove crucial when evaluating the performance of macroeconomic models, especially those
that explicitly account for agents’ heterogeneity. Moreover, it is important to understand to what
extent changes in social insurance systems aﬀect smoothing abilities, and the consequences of this
for private saving behavior. This is important as far as the eﬃcient design and evaluation of social
insurance policy is concerned. Finally, the presence of mechanisms that allow households to smooth
idiosyncratic shocks has a bearing on aggregation results [see Blundell and Stoker, 2004].
A study of this kind requires in principle good quality longitudinal data on household con-
sumption and income. It is well known that the PSID contains longitudinal income data but the
4Krueger and Perri [2003] investigate insurance of transitory shocks through analytic solution of simple models
and simulation of more complex cases and demonstrate the possibility that consumption variance can actually fall
with an increase in the variance of income shocks.
4information on consumption is scanty (limited to food and few more items). Our strategy is to
impute consumption to all PSID households combining PSID data with consumption data from
repeated CEX cross-sections. Previous studies [Skinner, 1987] impute non-durable consumption
data in the PSID using CEX regressions of non durable consumption on consumption items (food,
housing, utilities) and demographics available in both the PSID and the CEX. Although related, our
approach starts from a standard demand function for food (a consumption item available in both
surveys); we make this depend on prices, total non durable expenditure, and a host of demographic
and socio-economic characteristics of the household. Food expenditure and total expenditure are
modeled as jointly endogenous. Under monotonicity (normality) of food demands these functions
can be inverted to obtain a measure of non durable consumption in the PSID. In a companion paper
[Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston, 2004] we review the conditions that make this procedure reliable
and show that it is able to reproduce remarkably well the trends in the consumption distribution.
The paper continues with an illustration of the model we estimate and of the identiﬁcation
strategy we use (Section 2). In Section 3 we discuss data issues and the imputation procedure.
Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Income and Consumption Dynamics
2.1 The income process
The unit of analysis is a household, comprising a couple and, if present, their children. Our
sample selection focuses on income risk and we do not model divorce, widowhood, and other
household breaking-up factors. We recognize that these may be important omissions that limit
the interpretation of our study. However, by focusing on stable households and the interaction of
consumption and income we are able to develop a complete identiﬁcation strategy.5 We also select
5W h e t h e rs t a b l ef a m i l i e sh a v ea c c e s st om o r eo rl e s si n s urance than non-stable families is an issue that cannot
be settled in principle. On the one hand, stable families have often more incomes and assets and therefore are less
likely to be eligible for social insurance, which is typically means-tested. On the other hand, they can plausibly be
more successful in securing access to credit, family networks and other informal insurance devices, over and above
self-insurance through saving.
5households during the working life of the husband.
We assume that the sole relevant source of uncertainty faced by the consumer is income (deﬁned
as the sum of labor income and transfers, such as welfare payments). We also assume that labor is
supplied inelastically and make the assumption of separability in preferences between consumption
and leisure. This means all insurance provided through, say, an added worker eﬀect, will pass
through disposable income. Similarly, it is possible that the wage component of family income may
have already been smoothed out relative to productivity by implicit agreements within the ﬁrm. If
this insurance is present, it will be reﬂected in the variability of income.
The income process for each household i we consider is:
logYi,a,t = Z0
i,a,tϕt + Hi,a,t + vi,a,t (1)
where a and t index age and time respectively, Y is real income, and Z is a set of income characteris-
tics observable and anticipated by consumers. (Note that we allow the eﬀect of such characteristics
to shift with calendar time.) Equation (1) decomposes the remainder of income into a permanent
component Hi,a,t and a transitory or mean-reverting component, vi,a,t.B yw r i t i n gYi,a,t rather than
Yi,t we emphasize the importance of cohort eﬀects in the evolution of earnings over the life-cycle.
In keeping with this remark, we also study consumption decisions of diﬀerent cohorts separately.
For consistency with previous empirical studies [MaCurdy, 1982; Abowd and Card, 1989; Moﬃtt
and Gottschalk, 1994; Meghir and Pistaferri, 2004], we assume that the permanent component Hi,a,t
follows a martingale process of the form:
Hi,a,t = Hi,a−1,t−1 + ζi,a,t (2)
where ζi,a,t is serially uncorrelated, and the transitory component vi,a,t follows an MA(q) process,





6with θ0 ≡ 1. It follows that (unexplained) income growth is
∆yi,a,t = ζi,a,t + ∆vi,a,t (3)
where yi,a,t =l o gYi,a,t − Z0
i,a,tϕt denotes the log of real income net of predictable individual com-
ponents.
2.2 Insurance and the Transmission of Income Shocks to Consumption
2.2.1 Self Insurance










i,a+j,t+jϑt+j incorporates taste shifters and discount rate heterogeneity. Maximization of
(4) is subject to the budget constraint
Ai,a+j+1,t+j+1 =( 1+rt+j)(Ai,a+j,t+j + Yi,a+j,t+j − Ci,a+j,t+j) (5)
Ai,T,t+T−a =0 (6)
with Ai,a,t given. We set the retirement age after which income falls to zero at L, assumed known and
certain, and the end of the life-cycle at age T. We assume that there is no interest rate uncertainty
or uncertainty about the date of death. If preferences are of the CRRA form (u(C)=Cβ−1
β )a n d
credit markets are perfect, then optimal consumption choices can be described by an approximate
consumption growth equation, derived in Appendix A.1, which provides a mapping from the income
shocks ζi,a,t and εi,a,t to the optimal consumption growth, given by
∆ci,a,t ∼ = πi,a,tζi,a,t + πi,a,tγt,Lεi,a,t + ξi,a,t (7)
where ∆ci,a,t = ∆logCi,a,t − ∆Z0
i,a,tϑt − Γb,t is the log of real consumption net of its predictable
components. Appendix A.1 shows that the term Γb,t is the slope of the consumption path for the
individual’s year-of-birth cohort (which we index with b), while ξi,a,t is a random term that can
7be interpreted as the individual deviation from the cohort-speciﬁc consumption gradient.6 The
coeﬃcients on the income shocks are determined by πi,a,t, which is the share of future labor income
in the present value of lifetime wealth, and γt,L, which is an age-increasing known weight.7
Interpretation of the impact of income shocks on consumption growth is straightforward. For
individuals a long time from the end of their life with the value of current ﬁnancial assets small
relative to remaining future labor income, πi,a,t ' 1, and permanent shocks pass through more
or less completely into consumption whereas transitory shocks are (almost) completely insured
against through saving. This is the main insight of the textbook permanent income hypothesis
[Deaton, 1992]. Precautionary saving can provide eﬀective self-insurance against permanent shocks
only if the stock of assets built up is large relative to future labor income, which is to say πi,a,t
is appreciably smaller than unity, in which case there will also be some smoothing of permanent
shocks through self insurance (see also Carroll, 2001, for numerical simulations).
2.2.2 Additional Insurance
While precautionary saving might allow some insurance of permanent shocks if assets are large
enough relative to future labor income (i.e. πi,a,t < 1) other interpersonal insurance mechanisms
might also underlie this. We now consider the possibility of additional insurance and suppose there
are mechanisms (that we do not model explicitly here but were discussed in the Introduction)
that allow insurance of a fraction (1 − φb,t) and (1 − ψb,t) of permanent and transitory shocks,
respectively. We might expect φb,t to be close to unity and ψb,t close to zero.8
In this case consumption growth can be written as:
∆ci,a,t ∼ = φb,tζi,a,t + ψb,tεi,a,t + ξi,a,t (8)
The economic interpretation of the partial insurance parameter is such that it nests the two polar
6Innovations to the conditional variance of consumption growth (precautionary savings) are captured by Γb,t.
7See Appendix A.1. Results from a simulation of a stochastic economy presented in Blundell, Low and Preston
(2004) show that this approximation can be used to accurately detect changes in the time series pattern of permanent
and transitory variances to income shocks. These results are available on request (by email to: i.preston@ucl.ac.uk).
8If there are no interpersonal mechanisms or transfers of any sort, then φb,t = ψb,t = πi,a,t =1 .
8cases of full insurance of income shocks (φb,t = ψb,t =0 ), as contemplated by the complete markets
hypothesis, and no insurance (φb,t = ψb,t =1 ), as well as the intermediate case φb,t = ψb,t/γt,L =
πi,a,t predicted by the PIH with self-insurance through savings. A value 0 <φ b,t < 1 (0 <ψ b,t < 1)
is consistent with partial insurance with respect to permanent (transitory) shocks. The lower the
coeﬃcient, the higher the degree of insurance.
2.2.3 Advance Information
In the analysis presented so far we have assumed that in the innovation process for income
(3) the random variables ζi,a,t and εi,a,t represent the arrival of new information to the agent i
of age a in period t. If parts of these random terms were known in advance to the agent then
the consumption model would argue that they should already be incorporated into consumption
plans and would not directly eﬀect consumption growth (8). Suppose, for example, that only a
proportion κ of the permanent shock was unknown to the consumer. Then the consumption growth
relationship (8) would become
∆ci,a,t ∼ = e φb,t κζ i,a,t + ψb,tεi,a,t + ξi,a,t. (9)
where e φb,t is the “true” insurance parameter. In this case φb,t would be underestimated by the
information factor κ.
The econometrician will treat ζi,a,t as the permanent shock. Whereas the individual may have
already adapted to this change. Consequently, although transmission of income inequality to con-
sumption inequality is correctly identiﬁed, the estimated φb,t has to be interpreted as reﬂecting a
combination of insurance and information. In the absence of outside information (such as, say, sub-
jective expectations), these two components cannot be separately identiﬁed. The issue is discussed
further in Section 4 where we interpret our empirical results.
When we allow for partial insurance or advance information, we are unable to separately identify
how precautionary saving (through πi,a,t) and either partial insurance over and above saving or
foresight smooth the impact of shocks on consumption. However, this will be practically of little
9importance. We will be identifying a parameter that combines self-insurance, partial insurance,
foresight and perhaps even the crowding out eﬀect of public insurance on private insurance. In other
words, our generalised partial insurance parameters will still pin down the degree of transmission
of income shocks into consumption, which is our primary objective.
2.3 Evolution of Income and Consumption Variances
We assume that ζi,a,t, vi,a,t and ξi,a,t are mutually uncorrelated processes. Equation (3) can be used
to derive the following covariance restrictions in panel data
cov(∆ya,t,∆ya+s,t+s)=
½





where var (.) and cov(.,.) denote cross-sectional variances and covariances, respectively (the index i
is consequently omitted). These moments can be computed for the whole sample or for individuals
belonging to a homogeneous group (i.e., born in the same year, with the same level of schooling,
etc.). The covariance term cov(∆va,t,∆va+s,t+s) depends on the serial correlation properties of v.
If v is an MA(q) serially correlated process, then cov(∆va,t,∆va+s,t+s) is zero whenever |s| >q+1.
Note also that if v is serially uncorrelated (vi,a,t = εi,a,t), then var (∆va,t)=v a r( εa,t)+var(εa−1,t−1).
See also Moﬃtt and Gottschalk [1994]. Identiﬁcation of the serial correlation coeﬃcients does not
hinge on the order of the process q.A l l o w i n g f o r a n M A ( q) process, for example, adds q − 1
extra parameter (the q − 1 MA coeﬃcients) but also q − 1 extra moments, so that identiﬁcation is
unaﬀected.
The panel data restrictions on consumption growth from (8) are as follows:
cov(∆ca,t,∆ca+s,t+s)=φ2
b,tvar (ζa,t)+ψ2
b,tvar (εa,t)+v a r( ξa,t) (11)
for s =0and zero otherwise (due to the consumption martingale assumption).






10for s =0 ,a n ds>0 respectively. If v is an MA(q) serially correlated process, then cov(∆ca,t,∆ya+s,t+s)
is zero whenever |s| >q +1.T h u s ,i fv is serially uncorrelated (vi,a,t = εi,a,t), then cov(∆ca,t,∆ya+s,t+s)=
−ψb,tvar (εa,t) for s =1and 0 otherwise.
Note ﬁnally that it is likely that measurement error will contaminate the observed income and
consumption data. Assume that both consumption and income are measured with multiplicative
independent errors, e.g.,
y∗





i,a,t = ci,a,t + uc
i,a,t (14)
where x∗ denote a measured variable, x its true, unobservable value, and u the measurement
error. In Appendix A.2 we show that the partial insurance parameter φb,t remains identiﬁed
under measurement error, while only a lower bound for ψb,t is identiﬁable. A corollary of this is
that the variance of measurement error in consumption can be identiﬁed (the theory suggests that
consumption should be a martingale with drift, so any serial correlation in consumption growth can
only be attributed to noise), but the variance of the measurement error in income can still not be
identiﬁed separately from the variance of the transitory shock.9 The goal of the empirical analysis
is to estimate features of the distribution of income shocks (variances of permanent and transitory
shocks and the extent of serial correlation in the latter) and consumption growth (particularly the
partial insurance parameters) using joint panel data on income and consumption growth on which
the theoretical restrictions (10)-(12) have been imposed.
In the context of identifying sources of variation in household income and consumption, it is
worth stressing that in addition to identifying the partial insurance parameters, the availability of
panel data presents several advantages over a repeated cross-sections analysis. With repeated cross
sections the variances and covariances of diﬀerences in income and consumption cannot be observed,
9T h u st h ev a r i a n c eo fm e a s u r e m e n terror in consumption is identiﬁed by −cov(∆ca,t,∆ca+1,t+1).
11though it is possible to make assumptions under which variances of shocks can be identiﬁed from
diﬀerences in variances and covariances of their levels. For example, under the assumption that
shocks are cross-sectionally orthogonal to past consumption and income and that transitory shocks
are serially uncorrelated, Blundell and Preston [1998] use repeated cross-section moments to sepa-
rate the growth in the variance of transitory shocks to log income from the variance of permanent
shocks (see also Deaton and Paxson [1994]). This orthogonality assumption will be violated if, say,
knowledge of one’s position in the income (or consumption) distribution conveys information about
the distribution of future shocks to income. In panel data, identiﬁcation does not require making
such assumption and can allow for serial correlation in transitory shocks as well as measurement
error in consumption and income data (see below).
With panel data the identiﬁcation of the variances of shocks to income requires only panel
data on income, not consumption. In the simple case of serially uncorrelated transitory shock, for
example:10
var (ζa,t)=c o v( ∆ya,t,∆ya−1,t−1 + ∆ya,t + ∆ya+1,t+1) (15)
var (εa,t)=−cov(∆ya,t,∆ya+1,t+1) (16)
Using panel data on both consumption and income improves eﬃciency of these estimates because
it provides extra moments for identiﬁcation. We will show that the two sets of estimates are basically
the same. The joint use of consumption and income data allows identiﬁcation of the insurance
parameters that would not be identiﬁable with income or consumption data used in isolation. In
turn, knowledge of the extent of insurance is informative about the welfare eﬀects of shifts in the
income distribution.
10See Meghir and Pistaferri [2004] for a generalization to serially correlated transitory shocks and measurement
error in income.
123 The data
Our empirical analysis combines microeconomic data from two sources: the 1978-1992 PSID and
the 1980-1992 CEX. We describe their main features and our sample selection procedures in turn.
3.1 The PSID
Since the PSID has been widely used for microeconometric research, we shall only sketch the
description of its structure in this section.11
The PSID started in 1968 collecting information on a sample of roughly 5,000 households. Of
these, about 3,000 were representative of the US population as a whole (the core sample), and
about 2,000 were low-income families (the Census Bureau’s Survey of Economic Opportunities, or
SEO sample). Thereafter, both the original families and their split-oﬀs (children of the original
family forming a family of their own) have been followed.
The PSID includes a variety of socio-economic characteristics of the household, including ed-
ucation, food spending, and income of household members. Questions referring to income are
retrospective; thus, those asked in 1993, say, refer to the 1992 calendar year. In contrast, the tim-
ing of the survey questions on food expenditure is much less clear [see Hall and Mishkin, 1982, and
Altonji and Siow, 1987, for two alternative views]. Typically, the PSID asks how much is spent on
food in an average week. Since interviews are usually conducted around March, it has been argued
that people report their food expenditure for an average week around that period, rather than
for the previous calendar year as is the case for family income. We assume that food expenditure
reported in survey year t refers to the previous calendar year, but check the eﬀect of alternative
assumptions.
Households in the PSID report their taxable family income (which includes transfers and ﬁ-
nancial income). The measure of income used in the baseline analysis below excludes income from
ﬁnancial assets, subtracts taxes and deﬂates the corresponding value by the CPI. We obtain an
11See Hill [1992] for more details about the PSID.
13after-tax measure of income subtracting federal taxes paid. Before 1991, these are computed by
PSID researchers and added into the data set using information on ﬁling status, adjusted gross
income, whether the respondent itemizes or takes the standard deduction, and other household
characteristics that make them qualify for extra deductions, exemptions, and tax credits. Federal
taxes are not computed in 1992 and 1993. We impute taxes for the last two years using regression
analysis for the years where taxes are available (results not reported but available on request).
Education level is computed using the PSID variable “grades of school ﬁnished”. Individuals
who changed their education level during the sample period are allocated to the highest grade
achieved. We consider two education groups: with and without college education (corresponding
to 13 grades or more and 12 grades or less, respectively).
Since CEX data are available on a consistent basis since 1980, we construct an unbalanced
PSID panel using data from 1978 to 1992 (the ﬁrst two years are retained for initial conditions
purposes). Due to attrition, changes in family composition, and various other reasons, household
heads in the 1978-1992 PSID may be present from a minimum of one year to a maximum of ﬁfteen
years. We thus create unbalanced panel data sets of various length. The longest panel includes
individuals present from 1978 to 1992; the shortest, individuals present for two consecutive years
only (1978-79, 1979-80, up to 1991-92).
The objective of our sample selection is to focus on a sample of continuously married couples
headed by a male (with or without children). The step-by-step selection of our PSID sample is
illustrated in Table I. We eliminate households facing some dramatic family composition change
over the sample period. In particular, we keep only those with no change, and those experiencing
changes in members other than the head or the wife (children leaving parental home, say). We
next eliminate households headed by a female, those with missing report on education and region,12
and those with topcoded income. We keep continuously married couples and drop some income
12When possible, we impute values for education and region of residence using adjacent records on these variables.
14outliers.13 We then drop those born before 1920 or after 1959.
As noted above, the initial 1967 PSID contains two groups of households. The ﬁrst is represen-
tative of the US population (61 percent of the original sample); the second is a supplementary low
income subsample (also known as SEO subsample, representing 39 percent of the original 1967 sam-
ple). For the most part we exclude SEO households and their split-oﬀs. However, we do consider
the robustness of our results in the low income SEO subsample.
Finally, we drop those aged less than 30 or more than 65. This is to avoid problems related to
changes in family composition and education, in the ﬁrst case, and retirement, in the second. The
ﬁnal sample used in the minimum distance exercise below is composed of 17,788 observations and
1,788 households.
We use information on age and the survey year to allocate individuals in our sample to four
cohorts deﬁned on the basis of the year of birth of the household head: born in the 1920s, 1930s,
1940s, and 1950s. Years where cell size is less than 100 are discarded.14
3.2 The CEX
The Consumer Expenditure Survey provides a continuous and comprehensive ﬂow of data on
the buying habits of American consumers. The data are collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
a n du s e dp r i m a r i l yf o rr e v i s i n gt h eC P I . 15 The deﬁnition of the head of the household in the CEX
is the person or one of the persons who owns or rents the unit; this deﬁnition is slightly diﬀerent
from the one adopted in the PSID, where the head is always the husband in a couple. We make
the two deﬁnitions compatible.
The CEX is based on two components, the Diary survey and the Interview survey. The Diary
sample interviews households for two consecutive we e k s ,a n di ti sd e s i g n e dt oo b t a i nd e t a i l e de x p e n -
13An income outlier is deﬁned as a household with an income growth above 500 percent, below −80 percent, or
with a level of income below $100 a year or below the amount spent on food.
14Median (average) cell sizes are 249 (219), 245 (246), 413 (407), and 398 (363), respectively for those born in the
1920s, 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s.
15A description of the survey, including more details on sample design, interview procedures, etc., may be found
in “Chapter 16: Consumer Expenditures and Income”, from the BLS Handbook of Methods.
15ditures data on small and frequently purchased items, such as food, personal care, and household
supplies. The Interview sample follows survey households for a maximum of 5 quarters, although
only inventory and basic sample data are collected in the ﬁrst quarter. The data base covers about
95% of all expenditure, with the exclusion of expenditures for housekeeping supplies, personal care
products, and non-prescription drugs. Following most previous research, our analysis below uses
only the Interview sample.16
As the PSID, the CEX collects information on a variety of socio-demographic variables, includ-
ing income and consumer expenditure. Expenditure is reported in each quarter and refers to the
previous quarter; income is reported in the second and ﬁfth interview (with some exceptions), and
refers to the previous twelve months. For consistency with the timing of consumption, ﬁfth-quarter
income data are used.
We select a CEX sample that can be made comparable, to the extent that this is possible,
to the PSID sample. Our initial 1980-1998 CEX sample includes 1,249,329 monthly observations,
corresponding to 141,289 households. We drop those with missing record on food and/or zero
total nondurable expenditure, and those who completed less than 12 month interviews. This is to
obtain a sample where a measure of annual consumption can be obtained. A problem is that many
households report their consumption for overlapping years, i.e. there are people interviewed partly
in year t a n dp a r t l yi ny e a rt+1. Pragmatically, we assume that if the household is interviewed for
at least 6 months at t+1, then the reference year is t+1, and it is t otherwise. Prices are adjusted
accordingly. We then sum food at home, food away from home and other nondurable expenditure
over the 12 interview months. This gives annual expenditures. For consistency with the timing of
the PSID data, we drop households interviewed after 1992. We also drop those with zero before-tax
income, those with missing region or education records, single households and those with changes
in family composition. Finally, we eliminate households where the head is born before 1920 or
16There is some evidence that trends in consumption inequality measured in the two CEX surveys have diverged
in the 1990s [Attanasio, Battistin and Ichimura, 2004]. While research on the reasons for this divergence is clearly
warranted, our analysis, which uses data up to 1992, will only be marginally aﬀected.
16after 1959, those aged less than 30 or more than 65, and those with outlier income (deﬁned as a
level of income below the amount spent on food) or incomplete income responses. Our ﬁnal sample
contains 15,137 households. Table II details the sample selection process in the CEX.
The deﬁnition of total non durable consumption is the same as in Attanasio and Weber [1995].
It is the sum of food (deﬁned as the sum of food at home and food away from home), alcohol,
tobacco, and expenditure on other nondurable goods, such as services, heating fuel, public and
private transports (including gasoline), personal care, and semidurables, deﬁned as clothing and
footwear. This deﬁnition excludes expenditure on various durables, housing (furniture, appliances,
etc.), health, and education. In our empirical results we assess the sensitivity of our results to the
inclusion of durables and other non-durable items.17
3.3 Comparing and combining the two data sets
How similar are the two data sets in terms of average demographic and socio-economic char-
acteristics? Mean comparisons are reported in Table III for selected years: 1980, 1983, 1986, 1989,
and 1992. The PSID respondents are slightly younger than their CEX counterparts; there is, how-
ever, little diﬀerence in terms of family size and composition. The percentage of whites is slightly
higher in the PSID. The distribution of the sample by schooling levels is quite similar, while the
PSID tends to under-represent the proportion of people living in the West. Both male and female
participation rates in the PSID are comparable to those in the CEX. Due to slight diﬀerences in the
deﬁnition of family income, PSID ﬁgures are higher than those in the CEX. It is possible that the
deﬁnition of family income in the PSID is more comprehensive than that in the CEX, so resulting
in the underestimation of income in the CEX that appears in the Table. Total food expenditure
(the sum of food at home and food away from home) is fairly similar in the two data sets. Blundell,
Pistaferri and Preston [2004] provides a detailed comparison of the components of the total food
consumption series.
17We also tried with a deﬁnition of nondurable consumption that includes services from durables (housing and
vehicles). We thanks David Johnson at BLS for providing data on the latter.
17In deriving the theoretical restrictions in Section 2, we have assumed that a researcher has
access to panel data on household income and total non-durable consumption. However, this is
a very strong data requirement. In the US, panel data typically lack household data on total
non-durable consumption; and those surveys, such as the CEX, that contains good quality data
on consumption, lack a panel feature. We may however combine the two data sets to impute non
durable consumption to PSID households.18
The PSID collects data on few consumption items, mainly food at home and food away from
home. Moreover, food data are not available in 1987 and 1988. Our strategy is to write a demand
equation for food as a function of prices, demographics, and total non-durable expenditure. We
then use the inverse demand to obtain an imputed measure of total non-durable consumption.
This inversion operation requires consistent estimation of the parameters of the demand function
for food and monotonicity of the underlying demand function.
The technical details of the imputation procedure and a sequence of robustness tests are provided
in Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston [2004]. Brieﬂy, we pool all the CEX data from 1980 to 1992,
and write the following demand equation for food
fi,a,t = W0
i,a,tµ + β (Di,a,t)ci,a,t + ei,a,t (17)
where f is the log of food expenditure (which is available in both surveys), W contains prices and
a set of demographic variables (also available in both data sets), c is the (endogenous) log of total
non-durable expenditure (available only in the CEX), and e captures unobserved heterogeneity
in the demand for food and measurement error in food expenditure. We allow for the elasticity
β (.) to vary with time and with observable household characteristics. The estimation results for
our speciﬁcation of (17) are reported in Table IV. To account for measurement error and general
18Previous studies [Skinner, 1987] impute non-durable consumption data in the PSID using CEX regressions of
non durable consumption on consumption items available in both data sets. The only consumption items that are
available in the PSID on a consistent basis are food expenditure and rents (in the early years of the survey many
more items were available, such as utilities, alcohol, tobacco, child care, transport costs to work, and car insurance,
but their collection was discontinued mostly after 1972). Given that the majority of households own their home, the
rent variable must be imputed. If one is unwilling to use this variable, the Skinner procedure and the one we suggest
here (apart from our emphasis on controlling for prices and demographics) are very similar.
18endogeneity of total expenditure we instrument the latter with the average (by cohort, year, and
education) of the hourly wage of the husband and the average (also by cohort, year, and education)
of the hourly wage of the wife. The budget elasticity is 0.88 (0.81 in the OLS case). The price
elasticity is −0.96. We test the overidentifying restrictions and fail to reject the null hypothesis
(p-value of 56 percent). We also report statistics for judging the power of excluded instruments.
They are all acceptable. Generally the demographics have the expected sign.
For the purposes of this study a good inversion procedure should have the property that the
variance of (imputed) consumption in the PSID should exceed the variance of consumption in the
CEX by an additive factor (the variance of the error term of the demand equation scaled by the
square of the expenditure elasticity). If this factor is constant over time the trends in the two
variances should be identical. We refer the interested reader to Blundell, Pistaferri and Preston
[2004] for more details. Figure 1 shows that the variances line up extremely well. The range of
variation of the variance of PSID consumption is on the left-hand side; that of the variance of CEX
consumption, on the right hand side. Trends in the variance of consumption are remarkably similar
in the two data sets. In fact the reader can check that the variance of imputed PSID consumption is
just an upward-translated version (by about 0.05 units) of the variance of CEX consumption. Both
series suggest that between 1980 and 1986 the variance of log consumption (a standard measure of
consumption inequality) grows quite substantially. Afterwards, both graphs are ﬂat. In Blundell,
Pistaferri and Preston [2004] we show that this result is robust to variation in equivalence scale;
we also show that our imputation procedure is capable of replicating quite well the trends in mean
spending as long as account is made for diﬀerences in the mean of the input variable (food spending)
in the two data sets.
The evidence discussed in this section thus provides conﬁdence in our use of imputed data
to estimate the parameters of interest discussed in Section 2. We now turn to the results of our
empirical analysis.
194T h e r e s u l t s
We ﬁrst discuss the characterization of the variance-covariance structure of consumption and income
in the PSID. We then evaluate the relative size and trends in the variance of permanent and
transitory shocks to income and estimate the degree of insurance to these shocks for diﬀerent
sub-groups of the population.
4.1 Autocovariance Estimates of Consumption and Income: Longitudinal Evi-
dence from the Matched PSID
The PSID data set contains longitudinal records on income and imputed consumption. We remove
the eﬀect of deterministic eﬀects on log income and (imputed) log consumption by separate re-
gressions of these variables on year and year of birth dummies, and on a set of observable family
characteristics (dummies for education, race, family size, number of children, region, employment
status, residence in a large city, outside dependent, and presence of income recipients other than
husband and wife). We allow for the eﬀect of these characteristics to vary with calendar time.
These variables are assumed to reﬂect deterministic growth in consumption and income (e.g., in-
formation). We then work with the residuals of these regressions, ci,a,t and yi,a,t.
To pave the way to the formal analysis of partial insurance, Table V reports unrestricted mini-
mum distance estimates of several moments of the income process for the whole sample: the variance
of unexplained income growth, var (∆ya,t),t h eﬁrst-order autocovariances (cov(∆ya+1,t+1,∆ya,t)),
and the second-order autocovariances (cov(∆ya+2,t+2,∆ya,t)). Estimates are reported for each year.
Table VI repeats the exercise for our measure of consumption. Finally, Table VII reports minimum
distance estimates of contemporaneous and lagged consumption-income covariances. Some of the
moments are missing because, as said above, consumption data were not collected in the PSID in
1987-88.
Looking through Table V, one can notice the strong increase in the variance of income growth,
rising by more than 30% by 1986. Also notice the strong blip in the ﬁnal year (in 1992 the PSID
20converted the questionnaire to electronic form and imputations of income done by machine). The
absolute value of the ﬁrst-order autocovariance also increases through to 1986 and then is stable or
even declines. Second- and higher order autocovariances (which, from equation (10), are informative
about the presence of serial correlation in the transitory income component) are small and only in
few cases statistically signiﬁcant. At least at face value, this evidence seems to tally quite well with
a canonical MA(1) process in growth, as implied by a traditional income process given by the sum
of a martingale permanent component and a serially uncorrelated transitory component. Since
evidence on second-order autocovariances is mixed, however, in estimation we allow for MA(1)
serial correlation in the transitory component (vi,a,t = εi,a,t + θεi,a−1,t−1).
While income moments are informative about shifts in the income distribution (and on the tem-
porary or persistent nature of such shifts), they cannot be used to make conclusive inference about
shifts in the consumption distribution. For this purpose, one needs to complement the analysis
of income moments with that of consumption moments and of the joint income-consumption mo-
ments. This is done in Tables VI and VII. Table VI shows that the variance of imputed consumption
growth also increases quite strongly in the early 1980s, peaks in 1985 and then it is essentially ﬂat
afterwards. Note the high value of the level of the variance which is clearly the result of our imputa-
tion procedure. The variance of consumption growth captures in fact the genuine association with
shocks to income, but also the contribution of slope heterogeneity and measurement error.19 The
absolute value of the ﬁrst-order autocovariance of consumption growth should be a good estimate
of the variance of the imputation error. This is in fact quite high and approximately stable over
time. Second-order consumption growth autocovariances are mostly statistically insigniﬁcant and
economically small.
Table VII looks at the association, at various lags, of unexplained income and consumption
growth. The contemporaneous covariance should be informative about the eﬀe c to fi n c o m es h o c k s
19To a ﬁrst approximation, the variance of consumption growth that is not contaminated by error can be obtained
by subtracting twice the (absolute value of) ﬁrst order autocovariance cov(∆ct+1,∆ct) from the variance var (∆ct).
21on consumption growth if measurement errors in consumption are orthogonal to measurement errors
in income. This covariance increases in the early 1980s and then is ﬂat or even declining afterwards.
>From (14.6), the covariance between current consumption growth and future income growth
cov(∆ca,t,∆ya+1,t+1) should reﬂect the extent of insurance with respect to transitory shocks (i.e.,
cov(∆ca,t,∆ya+1,t+1)=0if there is full insurance of transitory shocks). We note that in the pure
self-insurance case with inﬁnite horizon and MA(1) transitory component, the impact of transitory
shocks on consumption growth is given by the annuity value
r(1+r−θ)
(1+r)2 . With a small interest rate,
this will be indistinguishable from zero, at least statistically. In fact, this covariance is hardly
statistically signiﬁcant and economically close to zero. As we shall see, the formal analysis below
will conﬁrm this. We should note, however, that for the low income sample examined further in
the empirical results below we do ﬁnd some sensitivity to transitory shocks.
The covariance between current consumption growth and past income growth cov(∆ca+1,t+1,∆ya,t)
plays no role in the PIH model with perfect capital markets, but may be important in alternative
models where liquidity constraints are present (a standard excess sensitivity argument, see Flavin
[1981]). The estimates of this covariance in Table VII are close to zero.
To sum up, there is weak evidence that transitory shocks impact consumption growth or that
liquidity constraints are empirically important in this sample. In the sensitivity results reported
below we note that there is more evidence of responsiveness to transitory shocks for the low in-
come poverty sample of the PSID. We now turn to more formal minimum distance estimation,
where we impose the theoretical restrictions outlined in Section 2.3 on the unrestricted income and
consumption moments of Table V, VI, and VII.
4.2 Partial Insurance
Our estimates are based on a generalization of moments (10)-(12). In particular, to account for
our imputation procedure, we assume that consump t i o ni sm e a s u r e dw i t he r r o r .W ee s t i m a t et h e
variance of the measurement error (σ2
uc)a s s u m i n gt h a ti ti si . i . d .W ea l s oc o n s i d e ra nM A ( 1 )p r o c e s s
22for the transitory error component of income (vi,a,t = εi,a,t + θεi,a−1,t−1), and estimate the MA(1)
parameter θ. Finally, we allow for i.i.d. unobserved heterogeneity in the individual consumption
gradient, and estimate its variance (σ2
ξ). We present the results of three speciﬁcations: one for
the whole sample (the “baseline” speciﬁcation), one where parameters are estimated separately by
education (college vs. no college), and one where parameters are estimated separately by cohort
(born 1930s vs. born 1940s).20 We also allow for some time non-stationarity. In particular,
in all speciﬁcations we let the variances of the permanent and the transitory shock, σ2
ζ and σ2
ε,
respectively, vary with calendar time. As for the partial insurance coeﬃcients for the permanent
shock (φ) and for the transitory shock (ψ), we assume that they take on two diﬀerent values, before
and after 1985. This is consistent with the the evidence in Figure 1, which divides the sample
period in a period of rapid growth in the variance (up until 1985), and one of relative stability
afterwards. We test the null that the extent of insurance does not change over time, and with
almost no exceptions we fail to reject the null. Tables VIII, IX, and X will thus present the results
of a simple model in which the insurance parameters are constant over time. We comment on the
time variability of the insurance parameters where appropriate and present the results of the test
in the tables.
The parameters are estimated by diagonally weighted minimum distance (DWMD). This esti-
mation method is a simple generalization of equally minimum distance (EWMD). Unlike EWMD, it
allows for heteroskedasticity. Moreover, it avoids the pitfalls of optimal minimum distance (OMD)
remarked by Altonji and Segal [1996], which are primarily related to the terms outside the main
diagonal of the optimal weighting matrix. Technical details are in Appendix A.3.21
The ﬁrst column of Table VIII shows the results for the whole sample. The estimated variances
20Results for the younger cohort (born in the 1950s) and the older cohort (born in the 1920s) are less reliable
because these cohorts are not observed for the whole sample period. We thus omit them.
21If we use EWMD we obtain extremely downward biased estimates of var(ζa,t) and extremely upward biased
estimates of var(εa,t) (compared to those we obtain using just income data, as in (15) and (16)). With DWMD the
two sets of estimates are similar because we are eﬀectively putting more “identiﬁcation weight” for the income shock
variances on the income moments and less on the consumption moments (which display more sampling variability
due to the imputation procedure).
23of the permanent shock and the estimated variances of the transitory shock are generally higher in
the second half of the 1980s (see also Figures 2 and 3). The MA parameter for the transitory shock
is small. The variance of the imputation error σ2
u is always precisely measured and suggests that
the imputation error absorbs a large amount of the cross-sectional variability in consumption in the
PSID. The variance of heterogeneity in the consumption slope is also small but signiﬁcant. In the
whole sample the estimate of φ, the partial insurance coeﬃcient for the permanent shock, provides
evidence in favor of partial insurance. In particular, a 10 percent permanent income shocks induces
a 6.1 percent permanent change in consumption. In contrast, the evidence on ψ accords with a
simple PIH model with inﬁnite horizon.22 If we allow the partial insurance parameters to vary
across time then we ﬁnd a lower estimate for φ − indicating more insurance − in the later part
of the 1980s. This is in line with the idea that a higher variance provides additional incentives to
insure. However the diﬀerences in the partial insurance parameters over time are not statistically
signiﬁcant and hence we decided to restrict the coeﬃc i e n tt ob ec o n s t a n to v e rt h ew h o l ep e r i o d .
The p-values for the test of constant insurance parameters over the two sub-periods are given in
the last two rows of the table.23
There is much discussion in the literature on the reasons for the increase in income inequality of
the last 25 years. In particular, there is much debate on whether the rise can be labeled permanent
or transitory. In Figure 2 we plot the minimum distance estimate of the variance of the permanent
shock, var(ζa,t), against time over the 1980s. There are two sets of estimates. One uses the full
set of consumption and income moments for the baseline speciﬁcation in Table VIII, and another
just utilizes the income data. There is a close accordance between the two series which provides
a check on the validity of our speciﬁcation. The ﬁgure points to a strong growth in permanent
income shocks during the early 1980s. The variance of permanent shocks levels oﬀ thereafter. This
22If we assume that food in the PSID reported in survey year t refers to that year rather than to the previous
calendar year, we obtain similar results. The estimate of φ is slightly higher, but the qualitative pattern of results
(and sensitivity checks) is unchanged.
23If we use a measure of consumption that includes the services from housing and vehicles we also obtain similar
results (the estimate of φ is 0.53 with s.e. 0.10, and the estimate of ψ is 0.06 with s.e. 0.04).
24evidence is similar to that reported by Moﬃtt and Gottschalk [1994] using PSID earnings data.
It is also worth noting that from trough to peak the variance of the permanent shock doubles. A
similar accordance between the two alternative estimates is also evident for the estimated variance
of transitory shocks presented in Figure 3. This variance increases quite dramatically in the second
half of the 1980s.
Table VIII also reports the results of the model for two education groups (with and without
college education), and for two representative cohorts (born in the 1940s and in the 1930s). As
before both the variance of the permanent shock and the variance of the transitory shock are
generally higher in the second half of the 1980s.24 The partial insurance parameter estimates point
to interesting diﬀerences in insurance by type of household. In particular there appears to be more
insurance in response to permanent shocks among the college educated group (indeed, we would
not statistically reject the null hypothesis that there is no insurance in the group without college
education). In contrast, the evidence on ψ accords with a simple PIH model and we cannot reject
the null that there is full smoothing with respect to transitory shocks (ψ =0 ) for both education
groups. When the sample is stratiﬁed by year of birth, we ﬁnd qualitatively similar results: there
is evidence for full insurance with respect to transitory shocks and diﬀerences in the extent of
insurance with respect to the permanent shocks. It is worth considering whether the presence of
precautionary asset accumulation is stronger among older cohorts close to retirement. Recall that
πi,a,t is the share of future labor income in the present value of lifetime wealth. Thus πi,a,t is likely
to be lower for older cohort because older cohorts have both more accumulated ﬁnancial wealth and
lower prospective human capital wealth. We ﬁnd evidence that permanent shocks are smoothed to
a much greater extent than for younger cohorts. However, whether this is due to the eﬀect played
by precautionary wealth accumulation remarked above or by greater availability of insurance (such
as social security or disability insurance) in the group of people born in the 1930s is something
24Since we stratify the sample by exogenous characteristics and estimate diﬀerent parameters for diﬀerent groups,
we are eﬀectively not considering the insurability of shocks across groups.
25that we cannot address in the absence of additional information, such as panel data on assets and
age-speciﬁc estimates of human capital wealth.
Having found evidence for partial insurance with respect to permanent income shocks, it is
interesting trying to understand where it comes from. Table IX examines the impact of possible
alternative insurance mechanisms. In particular, we focus on the insurance value of durable ex-
penditures and of government taxes and transfers. Turning ﬁrst to durables, one might expect the
φ coeﬃcient to rise simply because durables are more income elastic than nondurables. Moreover,
with small costs of accessing the credit market (or small transaction costs in the second-hand mar-
ket for durables), durable replacement could be used to smooth non-durable consumption in the
face of income shocks, see Browning and Crossley [2003] for example. This would imply that with
a measure of consumption that includes durables we should ﬁnd less evidence for insurance, i.e.,
the estimated φ and ψ would rise. The second column of Table IX investigates this further. We
use a comprehensive measure of consumption that includes durables and nondurables.25 We repeat
the imputation procedure detailed in Section 3.3, but use total consumption instead of nondurable
consumption in the estimation of the demand equation (17). First we note that the φ coeﬃcient
does rise slightly as expected. Durables appear to provide some limited insurance for permanent
shocks. Consider a permanent negative shock. In the absence of the durable hedge, one should
reduce non durable consumption by the same amount of the shock. Downgrading one’s car etc., and
slowing the rate of replacement can help smoothing partially the non durable consumption eﬀects
of the permanent shock. A symmetric argument holds for a positive shock. However, note that
durable expenditures appear to aﬀect the size and statistical signiﬁcance of the ψ coeﬃcient to a
much greater extent. This suggests that durables are particularly useful as a smoothing mechanism
in response to transitory shocks. In this respect, they work as an imperfect form of savings as
25See Meyer and Sullivan [2001] for a detailed discussion of the measurement of durables in the CEX. Our measure
of total consumption includes food, alcohol, tobacco, services, heating fuel, public and private transports (including
gasoline), personal care, semidurables (clothing and footwear), and expenditure on durables, namely housing (mort-
gage interests, property tax, rents, other lodging, textiles, furniture, ﬂoor coverings, appliances), new and used cars,
vehicle ﬁnance charges and insurance, car rentals and leases, health (insurance, prescription drugs, medical services),
education, cash contributions, and personal insurance (life insurance and retirement).
26suggested by Browning and Crossley (2003).
To see the impact of public insurance, suppose we exclude transfers (of any kind) from our mea-
sure of income. If taxes and transfers provide insurance for permanent income shocks, the insurance
parameter in this speciﬁcation should fall by an amount that reﬂects the degree of insurance. This
happens because consumption still incorporates any insurance value of taxes and transfers but the
new measure of income no longer does. The results of this experiment are reported in the last
column of Table IX. A comparison with the baseline results shows that the estimated insurance pa-
rameter declines from 0.61 to 0.38. That is, by excluding transfers the partial insurance coeﬃcient
drops by a little over a third, an estimate of the insurance provided by private and public transfers.
This insurance can also be seen through the change in the estimated variance of permanent and
transitory shocks. With taxes and transfers excluded, the variances of income shocks are indeed
much higher.26 Note also that the estimate of ψ is barely aﬀected, which seems to suggest that
taxes and transfers help more in the smoothing of permanent shocks (disability insurance is one
example) than in the smoothing of transitory shocks.
We next turn to our analysis of lower income families. Table X reports the results of extending
our sample to the families of the SEO (the low-income subsample in the PSID). We present the
estimates using the non-durable deﬁnition of consumption as in the baseline case and also the
estimates including durable expenditures in the consumption deﬁnition. Two pieces of evidence
are worth mentioning: the estimate of φ is higher reﬂecting less insurance opportunities in this
sample, and we would now reject full insurance with respect to transitory shocks (an estimate of
ψ of 0.12, not far from the 0.2 benchmark found by other researchers, as Hall and Mishkin [1982],
who impute this excess sensitivity of consumption to transitory income shocks to binding liquidity
constraints). Once we include durables we ﬁnd a φ coeﬃcient close to unity and the estimate of ψ
rises to 0.224 indicating an appreciable degree of sensitivity, even to transitory shocks, among the
26This is a case where we reject the hypothesis that φ is the same in the two sub-periods 1979-84 and 1985-92. In
practice, insurance tends to be higher in the second period perhaps because of the rise in the variance of earnings.
27low income sample.
Finally, Figure 4 plots the variance of the permanent shock for various speciﬁcations and sam-
ples, including the whole sample (top left panel). Overall, trends in the variance are remarkably
similar. One possible interpretation of this is that the diﬀerences in the estimates of φ that we ﬁnd
when we include the poverty sub-sample or durables, reﬂect genuine economic diﬀerences in access
to insurance rather than diﬀerences in the variance of permanent shocks.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The aim of this paper has been to evaluate the degree of consumption insurance with respect to
income shocks. This was achieved by investigating the degree to which the distribution of income
shocks is transmitted to the distribution of consumption. For this we combined panel data on
income from the PSID with consumption data from repeated CEX cross-sections. The framework
allowed for self-insurance, in which consumers smooth idiosyncratic shocks through saving, and
complete markets in which all idiosyncratic shocks are insured. Neither of these models were found
to accord with the evidence.
We ﬁnd some partial insurance for permanent shocks and almost complete insurance of transi-
tory shocks. Only in low income households do we ﬁnd signiﬁcant sensitivity, and therefore only
partial insurance, to transitory income shocks. Interestingly there appears to be a much greater
degree of insurance of permanent shocks among the college educated. Not surprisingly there is
also more insurance of such shocks for older cohorts. Our model suggests that we should see more
insurance, even for permanent shocks, among those nearing retirement, especially where they have
built up suﬃcient precautionary savings. The tax and welfare system are also found to play an
important insurance role for permanent shocks.
When we include durables in our measure of consumption we ﬁnd much less evidence of insurance
of permanent shocks. The impact on the estimate of the insurance parameter for transitory income
shocks is even greater. Here we ﬁnd signiﬁcant deviation from full insurance even for the regular
28PSID sample. This eﬀect gets stronger when we include the low income sub-sample. Durable
expenditures, that is the timing and quality of durable replacement, appear to provide an insurance
buﬀer between income shocks and non-durable expenditures. Especially for the lower income sample
who may have less access or face higher transactions costs in the credit market.
Our results also show a strong growth in permanent income shocks in the US during the early
1980s (the variance of transitory shock also increases, but at a later stage). From trough to peak
the variance of the permanent shock doubles, while the variance of the transitory shock only goes
up by about 50%. The variance of permanent shocks levels oﬀ in the second half of the 1980s.
The variance of the transitory shock is basically ﬂat in the period where the variance of permanent
shock is increasing, and it increases only when the variance of permanent shock slows down.
These results have implications for both macroeconomics and labor economics. The macro-
economic literature has long been concerned with explaining why modern economies depart from
the complete markets benchmark. Recent work has examined the role of asymmetric information,
moral hazard, heterogeneity, etc., and asked whether the complete markets model can be amended
to include some form of imperfect insurance. This issue has not been subject to a systematic em-
pirical investigation. Insofar as lack of smoothing opportunities implies a greater vulnerability to
income shocks, our research can be relevant to issues of the incidence and permanence of poverty
studied in the labor economics literature. Studying how well families smooth income shocks, how
this changes over time in response to changes in the economic environment confronted, and how
diﬀerent household types diﬀer in their smoothing opportunities, is an important complement to
understanding the eﬀect of redistributive policies and anti-poverty strategies.
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34Table I
Sample selection in the PSID
#d r o p p e d #r e m a i n
Initial sample (1968-1992) 0 145,940
Interviewed prior to 1978 52,408 93,532
Change in family composition 18,570 74,962
Female head 23,779 51,183
Missing values and topcoding 308 50,875
Change in marital status 5,882 44,993
Income outliers 2,407 42,586
Born before 1920 or after 1959 8,510 34,076
Poverty subsample 12,600 21,476
Aged less than 30 or more than 65 3,674 17,778
Table II
Sample selection in the CEX
#d r o p p e d #r e m a i n
Initial sample 0 141,289
Missing expenditure data 1,351 139,938
Present for less than 12 months 76,773 63,165
Observed after 1992 19,310 43,855
Zero before-tax income 1,308 42,547
Missing region or education 14,029 28,418
Marital status 5,848 22,570
Born before 1920 or after 1959 4,648 17,922
Aged less than 30 or more than 65 1,843 16,079
Income outliers and incomplete income response 942 15,137
35Table III
Comparison of means, PSID and CEX
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992
PSID CEX PSID CEX PSID CEX PSID CEX PSID CEX
Age 42.97 43.58 43.36 44.90 43.84 46.01 44.00 45.26 45.89 47.01
Family size 3.61 3.98 3.52 3.74 3.48 3.64 3.44 3.60 3.42 3.55
#o fc h i l d r e n 1.31 1.49 1.25 1.28 1.21 1.19 1.18 1.17 1.14 1.15
White 0.91 0.89 0.92 0.88 0.92 0.89 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.88
HS dropout 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.15
HS graduate 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.31 0.30
College dropout 0.49 0.47 0.52 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.54 0.56 0.56 0.55
Northeast 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22
Midwest 0.33 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.27 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.29
South 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.31 0.27 0.30 0.26
West 0.15 0.24 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.25 0.18 0.23 0.18 0.23
Husband working 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.90 0.94 0.92 0.93 0.88
Wife working 0.69 0.67 0.71 0.66 0.74 0.71 0.78 0.72 0.77 0.73
Family income 32,759 29,078 37,907 35,923 45,035 43,630 52,919 51,205 61,911 56,520
Food expenditure 4,449 4,656 4,858 4,617 5,306 5,199 5,864 6,135 6,620 6,431
36Table IV
T h ed e m a n df o rf o o di nt h eC E X
This table reports IV estimates of the demand equation for (the logarithm of) food spending in the
CEX. We instrument the log of total nondurable expenditure (and its interaction with time, education, and
kids dummies) with the cohort-education-year speciﬁc average of the log of the husband’s hourly wage and
the cohort-education-year speciﬁc average of the log of the wife’s hourly wage (and their interactions with
time, education and kids dummies). Standard errors are in round parenthesis; the Shea’s partial R2 for the
relevance of instruments in square brackets. In all cases, the p-value of the F-test on the excluded instrument
is <0.01 percent.






















































lnc ∗ 1985 0.0378
(0.0640)
[0.063]




lnc ∗ 1986 0.0287
(0.0589)
[0.067]








































(d.f. 18; p-value 56%)
37Table V
The autocovariance matrix of income growth
Year var(∆yt)c o v ( ∆yt+1,∆yt)c o v ( ∆yt+2,∆yt)
1980 0.0830 -0.0224 -0.0019
(0.0088) (0.0041) (0.0030)
1981 0.0813 -0.0291 -0.0038
(0.0090) (0.0049) (0.0035)
1982 0.0784 -0.0231 -0.0059
(0.0064) (0.0039) (0.0029)
1983 0.0859 -0.0242 -0.0093
(0.0092) (0.0041) (0.0053)
1984 0.0861 -0.0310 -0.0028
(0.0059) (0.0038) (0.0038)
1985 0.0927 -0.0321 -0.0012
(0.0069) (0.0053) (0.0042)
1986 0.1153 -0.0440 -0.0078
(0.0120) (0.0094) (0.0061)
1987 0.1185 -0.0402 0.0014
(0.0115) (0.0052) (0.0046)
1988 0.0929 -0.0313 -0.0017
(0.0084) (0.0041) (0.0032)
1989 0.0921 -0.0303 -0.0026
(0.0071) (0.0075) (0.0042)
1990 0.0988 -0.0303 -0.0056
(0.0135) (0.0056) (0.0045)
1991 0.1136 -0.0409 NA
(0.0245) (0.0141)
1992 0.1279 NA NA
(0.0153)
38Table VI
The autocovariance matrix of consumption growth
Year var(∆ct)c o v ( ∆ct+1,∆ct)c o v ( ∆ct+2,∆ct)
1980 0.1266 -0.0573 0.0020
(0.0106) (0.0087) (0.0053)
1981 0.1172 -0.0545 0.0029
(0.0115) (0.0072) (0.0043)
1982 0.1241 -0.0587 0.0005
(0.0099) (0.0080) (0.0049)
1983 0.1386 -0.0634 -0.0018
(0.0130) (0.0069) (0.0059)
1984 0.1559 -0.0738 -0.0121
(0.0127) (0.0117) (0.0082)
1985 0.1719 -0.0823 NA
(0.0214) (0.0188)
1986 0.1528 NA NA
(0.0177)
1987 NA NA NA
1988 NA NA NA
1989 NA NA NA
1990 0.1604 -0.0579 -0.0061
(0.0196) (0.0057) (0.0064)
1991 0.1457 -0.0619 NA
(0.0099) (0.0083)
1992 0.1371 NA NA
(0.0115)
39Table VII
The consumption-income growth covariance matrix
Year cov(∆yt,∆ct)c o v ( ∆yt,∆ct+1)c o v ( ∆yt+1,∆ct)
1980 0.0039 0.0052 0.0012
(0.0040) (0.0036) (0.0037)
1981 0.0102 -0.0052 -0.0050
(0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0033)
1982 0.0162 -0.0016 -0.0056
(0.0037) (0.0040) (0.0032)
1983 0.0204 -0.0055 -0.0075
(0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0046)
1984 0.0221 -0.0105 -0.0054
(0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0044)
1985 0.0177 -0.0033 -0.0024
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0054)
1986 0.0165 NA 0.0001
(0.0048) (0.0051)
1987 NA NA NA
1988 NA NA NA
1989 NA 0.0039 NA
(0.0039)
1990 0.0067 -0.0033 0.0026
(0.0042) (0.0039) (0.0060)
1991 0.0101 -0.0073 -0.0000
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0042)
1992 0.0111 NA NA
(0.0038)
40Table VIII
Minimum distance partial insurance and variance estimates
This table reports DWMD results of the parameters of interest. See the main text for details. Standard
errors in parenthesis.



















































































































































































































































































P-value test of equal φ 91% 66% 4% 15% 56%
P-value test of equal ψ 37% 42% 20% 45% 13%
41Table IX
Minimum distance partial insurance and variance estimates
This table reports DWMD results of the parameters of interest. See the main text for details. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
Consumption: Non dur. Total Non dur.
Income: Earn.+transf. Earn.+transf. Earnings only







































































































































































P-value test of equal φ 91% 20% 0.4%
P-value test of equal ψ 37% 73% 13%
42Table X
Minimum distance partial insurance and variance estimates
This table reports DWMD results of the parameters of interest. See the main text for details. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
Consumption: Non dur. Non dur. Total
Income: Earn.+transf. Earn.+transf. Earn.+transf.







































































































































































P-value test of equal φ 91% 58% 0.2%







































 Var. of log(C) PSID  Var. of log(C) CEX













Figure 1: The Variance of Consumption, PSID and CEX.
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Figure 2: The Variance of the Permanent Shock in the 1980s.
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Figure 4: The variance of permanent shocks in various speciﬁcations and samples.
47A.1 Appendix: The Euler Equation Approximation
If preferences are quadratic (and interest rates are not subject to uncertainty), it is possible to obtain a
closed form solution for consumption. It is also straightforward to derive an exact mapping between the
expectation error of the Euler equation for consumption and income shocks. See Hall and Mishkin [1982]
for example. Quadratic preferences have well known undesirable features, such as increasing risk aversion
and lack of a precautionary motive for saving. More realistic preferences, such as the CRRA functional form
used here, solve these problems but deliver no closed form solution for consumption. The Euler equation
can be linearized to describe the behavior of consumption growth. Moreover, in this appendix we derive an
approximation of the mapping between the expectation error of the Euler equation and the income shock.











Taking a Taylor expansion around lnXt+k =l nXt+
Pk
i=0 δt+i, k =1 ,...,S−t for some path of increments


























































i,a,tϑt + ηi,a,t + Ωi,a,t
where ηi,a,tis a consumption shock with Ea−1,t−1ηi,a,t =0and Ωi,a,t captures any slope in the consumption
path due to interest rates, impatience or precautionary savings. Suppose that any idiosyncratic component
to this gradient to the consumption path can be adequately picked up by a cohort/time-speciﬁcc o m p o n e n t
Γb,t and an individual element ξi,a,t
∆logCi,a,t − Γb,t − ∆Z0
i,a,tϑt = ∆ci,a,t ' ηi,a,t + ξi,a,t.
From (3) we also have











where T is death, L is retirement and Qt+k is appropriate discount factor
Qk
i=1(1 + rt+i), k =1 ,...,T − t
(and Qt =1 ).













t+k,L [lnYt+k − lnQt+k − lnα
∆Zϕ−r
t+k,L ]




k=0 Qt+kYt−k+At is the share of future labor income in current human and ﬁnancial wealth.
Taking diﬀerences in expectations gives









∆ci,a,t ' ξi,a,t + πi,a,tζi,a,t + γt,Lπi,a,tεi,a,t.
If ∆Z0




t+j,L =e x p ( −jr)/
PL
k=0 exp(−kr) ' r/(1+r)k
and γt,L ' r
1+r[1 +
Pq
j=1 θj/(1 + r)j].
A.2 Appendix: Measurement error
In the light of our imputation procedure, let’s assume that both consumption and income are measured with
multiplicative independent error, e.g., y∗
i,a,t = yi,a,t + u
y
i,a,t and c∗
i,a,t = ci,a,t + uc
i,a,t,w h e r ex∗ denote a
measured variable, x its true, unobservable value, and u the measurement error. Then rewrite equations (3)
and (8) (assuming no serial correlation of the transitory shock, stationarity and omitting slope heterogeneity
for simplicity) as:
∆y∗




i,a,t ∼ = φζi,a,t + ψεi,a,t + ∆uc
i,a,t



























































Assume that measurement error in income is orthogonal to measurement error in consumption. Under
the martingale assumption for consumption, σ2










The variance of the permanent shock is still identiﬁed from income data:
27Blundell, Low and Preston (2004) contains a lengthier derivation of such an expression, including discussion of
the order of magnitude of the approximation error involved.
2σ2






































uy cannot be told apart, and ψ thus remains unidentiﬁed. It is possible however to














Thus it is possible to argue that the estimate of ψ in Tables VIII-X is downward biased due to mea-
surement error in income. Using estimates contained in Meghir and Pistaferri [2004], a back-of-the-envelope
calculation shows that the variance of measurement error in earnings accounts for approximately 30% of the
variance of the overall transitory component of earnings. Given that our estimate of ψ is close to zero in
most cases, an adjustment using this inﬂation factor would make little diﬀerence empirically. To give an
example, the estimate of ψ in Table VIII, column 1, would increase from 0.05 to 0.07.
A.3 Appendix: Estimation details






















where, for simplicity, we indicate with 0 the ﬁrst year in the panel (1978) and with T the last (1992),
and the reference to age has been omitted. Since PSID consumption data were not collected in 1987 and
1988, the vector ∆ci is understood to have dim(∆yi)−3, i.e., the rows with missing consumption data have
already been sweeped out from ∆ci. Moreover, if the individual was not interviewed in year t, we replace



































i,t =1{∆ci,t is not missing} and d
y
i,t =1{∆yi,t is not missing}. Overall, this notation allows us to
handle in a simple manner the problems of unbalanced panel data and of missing consumption data in 1987
and 1988.





























3where ® denotes an elementwise division. The vector m contains the estimates of cov (∆yt,∆yt+s), cov (∆yt,∆ct+s),
and cov (∆ct,∆ct+s),at o t a lo fT (2T +1 )unique moments).28 To obtain the variance-covariance matrix of
m,d e ﬁne conformably with m the individual vector:
mi = vech{xix0
i}
















where Di = vech{did0
i} and ~ denotes an elementwise product. The square roots of the elements in the
main diagonal of V provide the standard errors of the corresponding elements in m.
What we do in the empirical analysis is to estimate models for m:
m = f (Λ)+Υ
where Υ captures sampling variability and Λ is the vector of parameters we are interested in (the variances
of the permanent shock and the transitory shock, the partial insurance parameters, etc.). For instance the
mapping from m to f (Λ) is:
⎛












⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜
⎝








⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟
⎠
+ Υ
We solve the problem of estimating Λ by minimizing:
min
Λ
(m − f (Λ))
0 A(m − f (Λ))
where A is a weighting matrix. Optimal minimum distance (OMD) imposes A = V−1, equally weighted
minimum distance (EWMD) imposes A = I, and diagonally-weighted minimum distance (DWMD) requires




For inference purposes we require the computation of standard errors. Chamberlain [1984] shows that













Λ=e Λ is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the estimated parameters b Λ.
28In practice there are less than T (2T +1 )moments because data on consumption are not available all
years.
4